LETTER FROM THE Secretary of War, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE, Appointed on the 9th of December last, ON SO MUCH OF THE SPEECH of the PRESIDENT, AS RELATES TO "A Syftem of National Defence, Commensurate with our Refources, and the fituation of our Country." 13th February, 1800. Ordered to lie on the Table. LETTER. War Department, January 31st, 1800. SIR, I HAVE the honor to submit, in compliance with your requisition, a few supplementary observations, and a view of the probable expence of the Military Schools respectfully recommended to consideration in my report, communicated to Congress, by a message dated the 13th instant, from the President of the United States. The report contemplates certain military fchools as an essential mean, in conjunction with a small military establishment, to prepare for, and perpetuate to the United States, at a very moderate expence, a body of scientific officers and engineers, adequate to any future exigency, qualified to discipline for the field, in the shortest time, the most extended armies, and to give the most decisive and useful effects to their operations. It is not conceived the United States will ever think it expedient to employ militia upon their frontiers, or to garrison their fortified places in time of peace, nor that they will be disposed to place their reliance, for defence, against a foreign invading enemy, upon militia alone; but that they will at all times maintain a body of regular troops, commensurate with their ability to maintain them, and the necessity or policy that may demand such an establishment. To qualify and keep our citizens in general, of suitable bodily ability, prepared to take the field, against regular forces, would demand the most radical changes in our militia fystem, and such an uninterrupted series of training, discipline and instruction, to be applied, as well to the officers, as to the men, as comports with regular troops only,—while in its results, the measure would be found on account of the loss to the community, occasioned by the abstraction from labour or occupation, and direct cost, greatly to exceed in expence, what would be required to support a moderate military establishment. This position, which is thought to be a found one, does not bring into view, the effects of the measure upon the morals, industry and habits of the citizens. Practically considered, may we not as well calculate to be commodiously lodged, and have the science of building improved, by employing every man in the community in the construction of houfes, and by exploding from fociety as useless, architects, mafons and carpenters, as expect to be defended efficiently from an invading enemy, by causing every citizen to endeavour to make himself master of the several branches of the act of war, and excluding engineers, scientific officers and regular troops. There is certainly, however, a fystem as it refpects our militia, which if resorted to and persevered in, may secure the utility of their services in times of danger, without much injury to the morals, or materially affecting the general industry of the nation. When the perfect order and exact discipline which are essential to regular troops are contemplated, and with what ease and precision they execute the different manœuvres indispensable to the fuccefs of offensive or defensive operations, the conviction cannot be resisted, that such troops will always have a decided advantage over more numerous forces composed of uninstructed militia or undisciplined recruits. It cannot yet be forgotten, that in our revolutionary war, it was not until after several years practice in arms, and the extension of the periods for which our soldiers were at first enlisted, that we found them at all qualified to meet in the field of battle thofe to whom they were opposed. The occasional brilliant and justly celebrated acts, of fome of our militia, during that eventful period, detract nothing from this dear bought truth. With all the enthusiasm which marked thofe days, it was perceived and universally felt, that regular and disciplined troops were indispensable, and that it was utterly unfair for us to trust to militia alone the issue of the war. The position therefore is illustrated, that even in times of the greatest danger, we cannot give to our militia, that degree of discipline, or to their officers that degree of military fcience upon which a nation may safely hazard its fate. The Great Man who conducted the war of our revolution, was continually compelled to conform his conduct to the circumftances growing out of the experimental lessons just mentioned. What was the fecret of his conduct? Must it be told? It may, and without exciting a blush or uneasy sensation in any of his surviving companions in arms. He had an Army of Men, but he had few Officers or Soldiers in that army. Both were to be formed, which could not be effected in a single campaign, or while his regiments were continually returning home, and like the waves of the fea, each in their turn lost in the abyss and succeeded by new ones. It was not till after he was furnished with a less fluctuating and more stable kind of force, that he could commence with a prospect of advantage, military instructions or inforce the ordinances of discipline: and even then he felt that *time and instruction* were required to render his labours useful and enable his army to meet the enemy upon any thing like *equal terms*. Are we to profit by or is this experience to be lost to our country? The art of war, which gives to a small force the faculty to combat with advantage superior numbers, *indifferently instructed*, is subjected to mechanical, geometrical, moral and physical rules; it calls for profound study; its theory is immenfe; the details infinite, and its principles rendered useful only by a happy adaptation of them to all the circumftances of place and ground, varioufly combined, to which they may be applicable. Is it possible for an officer of militia, to obtain a competent knowledge of thefe things in the fhort fpace his ufual avocations will permit him to devote to their acquifition? Is it possible for any officer, having acquired a knowledge of thefe details, this theory and thefe principles, to carry them into useful practice with a handful of militia, in the few days in each year alotted by law to trainings and exercises? Is that perfect subordination and obedience of men to their officers, and of each *inferior* to his *fuperior officer*, through all the grades of rank from the corporal up to the commander in chief, which forms a vital principle essential to the energy and force of armies, to be acquired by or communicated to a body of militia organized and trained according to our laws? And does it confist with a humane and enlightened policy to march men fo imperfectly instructed and disciplined, unless in cafes of the last extremity, against veteran troops (where this principle reigns in full activity) commanded by skilful and fcientific officers? Admitting, however, that militia officers during the few months the law permits their corps to be retained in *actual fervice*, could render their men by incessant instruction capable of fulfilling the object of their destination; yet as that advantage is but momentary, as thefe borrowed instruments must be quickly returned to the depot which furnished them, as new ones must be resorted to and successively instructed; what can be expected from such a fystem, but perpetual incoherence between the means and the end, and certain fhipwreck to the best connected and combined military projects. This best connected and combined—it cannot, however, be too often repeated, because it can never be refuted. The fecret of difcipline, and the importance of military fcience, were well known to thofe ancient governments whofe generals and troops have filled the world with the fplendor of their victories. According to *Scipio*, nothing contributed to the fuccefs of enterprises fo much as skill in the individual officers. The feverity of the Roman difcipline is well understood, and the estimation in which it was held by *Cæfar*. *Livy* has observed, that *fcience* does more in war than *force*. *Vigitius*, that it is neither *numbers*, nor *blind valor* which infures victory, but that it generally follows *capacity* and *fcience in war*. *Machiavel*, who has written upon military affairs, placed fo much dependence on an *exact difcipline*, and *military fcience*, as to efface from his lift of great generals, all thofe, who with *fmall armies*, did not execute *great things*: but to the committee, it is unnecessary to repeat the authorities of generals and writers of the first reputation, to fhew the high importance attached to military fcience and difcipline in all ages of the world, or resort to history for evidence of its effects. They must be well acquainted with the facts, and no doubt will give them their due weight in considering the fubjects now before them. There is however an authority, fo much in point relative to the essentiality of the institution in question, that I cannot forbear to mention it. The Marfhal de *Puifegur*, who has left an excellent treatise on the art of war, the result of his experience, obferves: "I have been perhaps at as many fieges as any of thofe in fervice, and in all forts of grades; as fubaltern I have commanded troops and working parties in a fiege; as Major I have conducted to the trenches and posts to which they were destined troops and labourers; I have been Major of Brigade, Marfhal de camp, and Lieutenant General: however, as I have not learned fortification, my practice has not enabled me to acquit myself in conducting attacks, fo that I should be obliged to suffer myself to be instructed in many things by the lights of Engineers, their practice being founded upon principles which are known to them, an advantage I have not in this branch of war." This is the candid acknowledgement of a man who had ferved fixty years in the army, who had learned the military art under a father, that in forty years fervice, had been prefent at two hundred fieges, and who had himfelf paffed through all the military grades, and arrived from an inferior to a fuperior rank, but after having deferved each fucceffive promotion by fome distinguished action. A flight attention to circumftances, and the actual pofition of our country, must lead to the conviction, that a well connected feries of fortifications, is an object of the higheft importance to the United States, not only as thefe will be conducive to the general fecurity, but as a mean of leffening the neceffity, and confequently the expence of a large military eftablifhment. By ftrongly fortifying our harbours and frontiers, we may reafonably expect, either to keep at a diftance the calamities of war, or render it lefs injurious when it fhall happen. It is behind thefe ponderous maffes only, that a fmall number of men can maintain themfelves for a length of time against fuperior forces. Impofing therefore upon an enemy, who may have every thing to tranfport acrofs the Atlantic, the neceffity of undertaking long and hazardous fieges, encreafes the chances against his undertaking them at all, or if he does, in defpite of fuch circumftances, infures to us the time he muft confume in his operations, to rally our means to a point and unite our efforts to refift him. We muft not conclude from thefe brief obfervations, that the fervices of the Engineer is limited to constructing, connecting, confolidating, and keeping in repair fortifications. This is but a fingle branch of their profeffion, though indeed a moft important one. Their utility extends to almoft every department of war, and every defcription of general officers, befides embracing whatever refpects public buildings, roads, bridges, canals and all fuch works of a civil nature. I confider it therefore of vaft confequence to the United States, that it fhould form in its own bofom, and out of its own native materials, men qualified to place the country in a proper pofture of defence, to infufe fcience into our army, and give to our fortifications that degree of force, connection and perfection, which can alone counterbalance the fuperiority of attack over defence. With thefe advantages in profpect, is it not incumbent upon us to haften with all reafonable diligence, the commencement and completion of an inftitution effential to realize them. And are expenditures which give fuch valuable refults, to be otherwife viewed than as real economy. It is a well known fact, that England had neither native artillerifts or engineers before the time of the Duke of Cumberland, and till after the eftablifhed military fchools. I fhall now, having refpectfully fubroitted thefe obfervations, prefent an eftimate of the expence of the military fchools which it appears to me ought to be immediately inftituted. Agreeably to the plan of the military academy, the directors thereof are to be officers taken from the army, confequently no expence will be incurred by fuch appointments. The plan alfo contemplates, that officers of the army, cadets and non-commiffioned officers, fhall recei**ve** inftruction in the academy. As the rations and fuel which thefe are entitled to in the army, will fuffice for them in the academy, no additional expence will be required for thefe objects of maintenance while there. The expences of fervants and certain incidental charges relative to the police and adminiftration may be defrayed by thofe who fhall be admitted out of their pay and emoluments. According to the plan contemplated, fifty officers, cadets, or non-commiffioned officers may be annually inftructed in the fundamental fchool and an equal number in the fchool of artillerifts and engineers; the only fchools which it is deemed expedient to bring into operation. To inftruct thefe may require, when both fchools are in full activity, the following profeffors, viz: *In the Fundamental School.* Dols. Cts. 2. Profeffors of Mathematics, at 800 Dols. per annum, and 2 rations per day, — 1848 20 2. Ditto, of Geography, and Natural Philofophy, — — — 1848 20 1. Ditto, of Chemiftry, — — — 924 10 1. Defigning and Drawing Mafters — — 724 10 5,844 60 *In the School of Artillerifts and Engineers.* 1. Profeffor of Mathematics, at 800 Dols. per annum, and 2 rations per day, — 924 10 1. Ditto, of Geography and Natural Philofophy, — — — 924 10 1. Ditto, of Chemiftry, — — — 924 10 1. Ditto, of Architecture, — — — 924 10 2. Defigning and Drawing Mafters, at 600 Dols. per annum, and 2 rations per day, 1448 20 5,144 60 Total, 10,489 20 The coft of the buildings for thefe two fchools, as the one or the other of the annexed plan fhall be adopted will be, viz: *Plan by John Foncin, Engineer.* For the Fundamental School. — 19,423 The School of Artillerifts and Engineers, fuppofed to coft an equal fum, — 19,423 38,846 *Plan by B. H. Latrobe, civil Architect and Engineer.* For the Fundamental School, — 40,000 The School of Artillerifts and Engineers, fuppofed to coft an equal fum, — 40,000 80,000 It may be proper to remind the Committee that no appropriation for the fchool of engineers and artillerifts will be required perhaps thefe two years, or till after the completion of the Fundamental School. The Secretary takes occafion alfo to mention, that the laws have already made provifion for four teachers or profeffors to the artillerifts and engineers, at a falary of eighty dollars per month, and two rations per day, which may be confidered equivalent to four thoufand three hundred and thirty fix dollars, and forty-fix cents per annum, and that the act providing for raifing and organizing a corps of artillerifts and engineers, paffed the 9th May, 1794, makes it "the duty of the Secretary of War to provide, at the public expence, under fuch regulations, as fhall be directed by the Prefident of the United States, the neceffary books, inftruments, and apparatus for the ufe and benefit of the faid corps." According to the plan and eftimate of the buildings by Mr. Foncin, the two fchools will coft thirty-eight thoufand eight hundred and forty-fix dollars. According to the plan and eftimate by Mr. Latrobe, the two fchools will coft eighty thoufand dollars. The modification of the two regiments of artillerifts and engineers, will liberate twenty thoufand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars annually. The eftablifhment of the two fchools will liberate the falaries of the four teachers before mentioned, or four thoufand three hundred and thirty-fix dollars annually. The books, apparatus and inftruments directed to be provided for the ufe of the artillerifts and engineers, are confidered as an adequate offset for the books, apparatus and inftruments required for the ufe of the fchools; confequently no charge has been ftated in the eftimate for thefe objects. If, therefore, we oppofe the fums thus annually liberated to the annual falary of the profeffors and original coft of the buildings, whichever of the plans is adopted, we fhall find the meafure propofed, viewed merely in the light of an operation of finance, to refult in a confiderable faving to the United States. An individual would think it a good bargain to receive twenty-five thoufand two hundred and ninety-one dollars, annually, the fum liberated, and to give in lieu thereof ten thoufand four hundred and fixty-fix dollars, annually, the falary of the profeffors, and a principal fum equal to the coft of the buildings. In other words, he would receive fourteen thoufand feven hundred and twenty-five dollars, annually, which is equivalent at fix per cent, to a capital or principal of two hundred and forty-five thoufand four hundred and fixteen dollars; a fum greatly exceeding the eftimated coft of the buildings upon either eftimate. The committee while they perceive that the feed which it is now propofed to fow, is to yield a future harveft, will at the fame time, juftly appreciate the various beneficial confequences which muft refult from the immediate adoption, and the ftriking inconveniencies and danger to be apprehended from a poftponement of the meafure. Whether our country is to be plunged into a war or enjoy for a length of time the bleffings of peace and interior tranquility; whether the portentous events which have afflicted Europe, and in their progrefs threatened the United States are to fubfide into a fettled ftate of things; whether the bleffings of peace and the cuftomary relations among the tranfatlantic powers, are to take place, or hoftilities fhall be continued protracted and extended beyond their prefent limits, in either view it is equally a fuggeftion of policy and wifdom to improve our means of defence, and give as much perfection as poffible to fuch eftablifhments as may be conceived