A Report on the Secretary of War, On certain measures which appear to him to be necessary for the improvement of our Military System.
Document 1800Report detailing necessary improvements to the current military system. Advocates for a standing army and necessary fortifications and education systems to produce and maintain said military.
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MESSAGE
FROM THE
President of the United States,
TRANSMITTING
A REPORT
OF THE
Secretary of War,
On certain measures which appear to him to be necessary for the improvement of our
MILITARY SYSTEM.
13th *January*, 1800.
Referred to the Committee, appointed on the 9th ultimo, to whom was referred so much of the Speech of the President as relates to "a system of national defence, commensurate with our resources, and the situation of our country."
Printed by order of the House of Representatives of the United States.
GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE, AND
GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
A REPORT, made to me, on the fifth of this month, by the Secretary of War, contains various matters, in which the honour and safety of the nation are deeply interested. I transmit it therefore to Congress and recommend it to their serious consideration.
JOHN ADAMS.
UNITED STATES,
*January* 13*th*, 1800.
REPORT, &c.
THE Secretary of War respectfully requests the attention of the President of the United States, to certain measures and arrangements, which appear to him to be indispensible, to the improvement of our military system, and solicits, if it shall be thought proper, that the same may be submitted to Congress.
No sentiment is more just than this, that in proportion as the circumstances and policy of a people are opposed to the maintenance of a large military force, it is important, that as much perfection as possible be given to that which may at any time exist.
It is not however enough, that the troops it may be deemed proper to maintain, be rendered as perfect as possible, in form, organization and discipline; the dignity, the character to be supported and the safety of the country further require, that it should have military institutions capable of perpetuating the art of war, and of furnishing the means for forming a new and enlarged army fit for service, in the shortest time possible, and at the least practicable expense to the state.
Let it not be presumed that a country, however distantly situated from other nations, or favored, by the courage and genius of its inhabitants, can neglect with impunity military institutions, or that it may safely consider all regular force to be useless, except when there is an enemy present to employ it. A country which acts upon such a maxim will invariably attract injuries and enemies, and sooner or later sink by in-
ternal discords, or see its noble spirit broke down, by repeated humiliations, and the whole people thus prepared for the last stage of national degradation.
If the farmer would secure his flocks, he must go to the expense of shepherds; if preserve his crops, he must enclose his fields. In like manner, to ensure safety to the nation, it is necessary that the leading avenues into it, be guarded by troops and fortifications. Before the invention of gun-powder, the smallest villages were invested with walls, so that a long siege was often requisite to reduce them. Since that epocha, the history of almost, if not, every war, contains undeniable proofs of the utility of fortifications, and the necessity of disciplined troops to the defence of a country. Would it be wise or expedient in us to pursue a different course, and shut our eyes against the innumerable facts on record in favor of their essentiality? Are we without regular troops, we may soon lose the military art; are we without engineers, not a little of the money employed on fortifications will be always hazarded, if not actually thrown away, and generals of the most consummate genius, forced to capitulate in the field, whose retreat might have been covered by a fortification, or the battle decided in his favor by a happily contrived intrenchment.
Since however it seems to be agreed, that we are not to keep on foot numerous forces, and it would be impossible on a sudden to extend to every essential point our fortifications; military science in its various branches ought to be cultivated, with peculiar care, in proper nurseries; so that a sufficient stock may always exist, ready to be imparted and diffused to any extent; and a competent number of persons be prepared and qualified to act as engineers, and others as instructors to additional troops, which events may successively require to be raised. This will be to
substitute the elements of an army to the thing itself, and will greatly tend to enable the government to dispense with a large body of standing forces, from the facility which it will give of procuring officers and forming soldiers promptly in all emergencies.
No found mind, after a fair view of the subject, can doubt the essentiality of military science in time of war, any more than the moral certainty, that the most pacific policy, on the part of government, and the most solemn and well observed treaties, will not preserve a country from being engaged in war more or less frequently. To avoid great evils, we must either have a respectable force always ready for service, or the means of preparing such a force with certainty and expedition. The latter as most agreeable to the genius of our government and nation, is the object of the following propositions.
1st. *A Military Academy.*
This object has repeatedly engaged the favorable attention of the Legislature, and some laws towards its consummation have been passed. These however being yet inadequate to afford the requisite instruction to officers and others, in "the principles of war, the exercises it requires, and the sciences upon which they are founded," the adoption of a more perfect plan is conceived to be indispensible for these purposes. With this view the following plan is respectfully suggested—formed upon those of institutions of a similar nature, from which the nations who have founded them, derive the most decided advantages.
It is proposed, that this Academy shall consist of four schools. One to be called "The Fundamental School." Another, "The School of Engineers and Artillerists." Another, "The School of Cavalry and Infantry." And a fourth, "The School of the
Navy"—and be provided with the following officers, professors and teachers:
A Director General to superintend the three first schools.
A Director of the Fundamental School.
A Director of the School of Engineers and Artillerists.
A Director of the School of Cavalry and Infantry.
A Director of the School of the Navy.
Six professors of mathematics.
Four professors of geography and natural philosophy.
Two professors of chemistry, including mineralogy.
Three architects.
Four designing and drawing masters.
One riding master.
One fencing master——to be thus distributed among the several schools:
*To the Fundamental School.*
One director.
Four professors of mathematics.
Two professors of geography and natural philosophy.
One designing and drawing master.
One professor of chemistry.
*To the School of Engineers and Artillerists.*
One director.
Two professors of mathematics.
Two professors of geography and natural philosophy.
One professor of chemistry.
Two architects.
Three designing and drawing masters.
*To the School of Cavalry and Infantry.*
A director.
A riding master.
A fencing master.
*To the School of the Navy.*
A director.
A professor of mathematics.
A professor of geography and natural philosophy.
An architect.
One designing and drawing master.
The Fundamental School is designed to form engineers, (including geographical engineers), miners and officers for the artillery, cavalry, infantry and navy, consequently in this school are to be taught all the sciences necessary to a perfect knowledge of the different branches of the military art.
The School of Engineers and Artillerists to teach those admitted therein, and appointed or designed for engineers, the *application* of the theoretic knowledge which they had acquired in the Fundamental School, to the construction of all sorts of fortifications and military buildings appertaining thereto, to mines and counter-mines, sieges, attack and defence, to mineralogy, to the art of projecting and constructing bridges, roads, canals and maritime ports, and all works relative thereto, to all geographic and topographic operations, the calculations relative to the same, to designing and drawing charts, &c.
To those appointed or designed for the artillery service, the application of the theoretic knowledge, acquired in the Fundamental School, to the construction of gun-carriages, pontoons, the fabrication of
cannon and fire-arms, and to all the manœuvres of war which depend upon artillery.
The School of Cavalry and Infantry, to teach those admitted therein and appointed to or destined for the cavalry, the tactics, exercise and police of cavalry; those for the infantry, the tactics of infantry, and all that concerns the police of an army in the field and in quarters.
The School of the Navy to teach those appointed to or destined for this service, the application of the knowledge acquired in the Fundamental School, in arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statics, and navigation. To this end, after having past examination, they shall make voyages or cruizes, under skilful officers, for certain periods, during which time they ought to be exercised in the manœuvres and observations most useful in service, and be instructed in whatever respects rigging of vessels of war, pilotage, and the management of cannon.
*Functions of the Principal Officers.*
The Director General to have the general superintendance of the military schools, particularly of the Fundamental School; to occupy himself incessantly with the means of attaining the end of the institution, which is the greatest possible instruction to the pupils.
He will inform himself of their progress in the studies relative to the service to which they are destined, and collect all the facts proper to be laid before the President, to enable him to form an opinion of the fitness of any individual who has not had one, for an appointment, or in case he has, to judge how, and where, his talents can upon occasion be most beneficially employed.
He will attend particularly to the execution of whatever respects the admission of pupils, their trans-
fer from the school of theory into that of practice, their passage from one class or division in the same school to another, and the examinations which they ought respectively to undergo.
He will propose a list of the officers of the army proper to be received into the schools, and will furnish the Secretary of War, with information from time to time relative to their progress, conduct and capacity to fill stations, to which their genius and knowledge may particularly point.
He will give such certificates to the officers, cadets or pupils, as they shall have merited.
The Directors of each of the military schools will receive from the Director General, instructions detailing their functions and powers; to him they will make their reports.
With respect to the School of the Navy, the Director thereof will receive his instructions from the Secretary of the Navy.
The Director General and the other directors to be officers of the army or navy, according as the studies and exercises of the particular school shall be most intimately connected with either service.
These schools to be provided with proper apparatus and instruments for philosophical and chemical experiments, for astronomical and nautical observations, for surveying and such other processes as are requisite to the several topics and branches of instruction.
The scite of the Schools of Engineers and Artillerists and of the Navy, ought to be on navigable water. For this purpose a piece of ground ought to be purchased sufficient for experiments in tactics, gunnery and fortification. The situation upon a navigable water is also requisite to admit of specimens of naval construction and naval exercises.
It would also tend greatly to the perfection of the plan, if the Academy of Artillerists and Engineers
Some attempts were made in *France* to introduce the horse-artillery before the revolution there; the subject however was not well understood; the general officers, who were present at the attempts, proposed to place the cannoneers, like the *Austrians*, on Wurfts.
In 1791, Mr. Duportail, Minister of War, authorized the Commandant of the division of Metz, to form two companies of horse-artillery: the success of this experiment was decisive and answerable to the Minister's expectations. The officers and men were in a few weeks in a condition to manœuvre with light troops.
In 1792, Mr. Narbonne, who succeeded to Mr. Duportail, composed a committee of the most enlightened officers of the army, to examine and decide upon the means of improving and extending in the French army the use of horse-artillery.
As no better idea can be given of this new military arm, than what is reported of the result of this conference, the Secretary takes the liberty to introduce it.
These officers resolved as fundamental points—
1. That a numerous horse-artillery well served, and kept complete in cannoneers and horses, was the most certain mean to protect the evolutions of troops *indifferently instructed*, to support their attack with bayonets, and to render null, by positions seasonably taken and with celerity, the advantage which *better disciplined* might confidently promise themselves from superiority in manœuvres.
2. That with respect to the employment of this arm, the rules of service, instruction, &c. the horse-artillery ought to differ from the field-artillery only, in having its pieces so managed, as to be drawn with the utmost celerity wherever they can produce the greatest effect, and in the cannoneers, being able to follow their guns, and commence action as soon as they are placed.
3. That to fulfil this object, it is more convenient to have the cannoneers all mounted on horses, than a part of them on *wurfts*, because on horses they are less subject to accidents, their movement more rapid, their retreat more secure, and the replacing of horses easy.
4. That without excluding any caliber, it appears, pieces carrying balls of eight and twelve pounds, and howitzers, may be most advantageously employed.
5. That it is unnecessary to discipline a horse-artillerist in the manœuvres of cavalry; that this would be a departure, without utility, from the principal object; that it is enough for him to know to sit firm on his horse, to mount and descend quickly and conduct him boldly; that it is not requisite to oblige him to preserve any order in following his piece, leaving it to his intelligence to learn if he chuses to execute the manœuvres of cavalry.
6. That the manœuvre, *a la prolonge* ought to be employed in every case, in which it is practicable to use it. That the horses remaining attached while the pieces are firing, one gains thereby all the time which would be lost in removing or replacing the *avant-train*, and thus one may pass fossés and rivers with the utmost celerity, and profit of positions.
7. That in order to form at once a requisite number of companies of horse-artillery, without weakening the artillery regiments, it is sufficient to employ for every piece two skilful cannoneers, and to draw upon the infantry for the rest.
On these principles the French have organized an establishment in their armies, from which they have derived the most important advantages in most, if not all their campaigns.
The decisive agency of horse-artillery, in *offensive war*, was manifested in the invasion of Belgium, by General Dumouriez, at the end of his campaign in
1792. The affair of *Waterlo* is equally in point, as to its superiority in *defensive operations*.
Whilst General *Pichegru* commanded the army of *Flanders*, four thousand cavalry, manœuvring with his horse-artillery, sustained the immense effort of an army of thirty thousand men, supporting an artillery chiefly of a different kind, of at least triple the force of that opposed to it.
*Buonaparte*, at the battle of *Castiglione*, after raising the siege of *Mantua*, having re-assembled several divisions of his horse-artillery in a well chosen position, under General *Domartin*, broke, by their means, the Austrian line, and thus decided a victory upon which depended the most important consequences in his favor.
It is also certain that the horse-artillery contributed not a little to gain the battle of *Ettingen*, where General *Moreau*, very inferior in cavalry, maintained, by its means, his left wing against the whole cavalry of the Arch Duke. The application of the horse-artillery procured to General *Hoche*, upon the Rhine, in the affair of Neuvied, like success.
The Arch Duke Charles, instructed by such events, has greatly augmented and improved this arm of the Austrian army. The English also have lately introduced horse-artillery into their service, but it is supposed too sparingly to derive therefrom its full effect.
Can an agent so superior in all offensive and defensive operations, and so vastly important from its nature, as well as the use made of it by other nations, be dispensed with in the composition of our army or neglected with impunity?
The author of a recent work, entitled, "Précis des événements militaires," published in numbers at Hamburg, from which most of the aforesaid facts respecting this powerful military agent have been taken, observes, "that it is become indispensible in all armies:
"it can accompany almost every where cavalry: it crosses rivers and morasses impassable to foot artillery: it thunders in mafs and with great rapidity upon an unexpected point of attack, turns a body of the enemy, takes him in flank or rear: can perform the service of advance posts: of artillery of position: of the rear guard, and in fine, that of a corps of reserve from which detachments may be made as wanted: it is free from the inconvenience ascribed to foot-artillery, of retarding and restraining the manœuvres and marches of troops: the French have therefore already confined the use of foot-artillery to the service of sieges, with the exception of four pounders, which they have yet left attached to battalions."
Horfe-artillery would seem to be peculiarly recommended to the United States by the reflection, that all attacks on the sea-board must be made by an enemy, water-borne from a distant country, who will consequently be ill provided with horses; whereas the United States having a knowledge of this agent, and resorting to their resources in horses, might be able to oppose a horse-artillery so superior, and so promptly, as to give decided advantages in attack or defence, and relieve their territory from being ravaged or long possessed in any part of it. If the United States shall prevent an enemy from procuring the horses of the country, and shall maintain a superiority in this forcible arm, they will have little to fear from invaders however powerful in infantry.
The two regiments of artillerists and engineers, as they now stand on the establishment, cost the United States, four hundred and twenty-seven thousand, five hundred and fifty-three dollars and eighty cents annually. There will result from the proposed arrangement of these regiments, as will appear by schedule A, a difference in time of peace of twenty thousand
nine hundred and fifty-five dollars and thirty cents annually, which sum may be applied to the expenses of the military academy.
When the preceding propositions are, respectfully submitted, as essential to the improvement of our military establishment, it would be improper to overlook such other measures as may occur, and it is believed, would conduce to perfect our preparations, for securing our rights.
The importance of the volunteer associations or companies, which may be accepted under "An act authorizing the President to raise a provisional army," passed the 28th May, 1798, has heretofore been presented by the Secretary. They may be considered as a reserve body, from which prompt and efficient reinforcements can be drawn, to our regular army, and as rallying and supporting points, when completely organized into regiments, brigades and divisions, for the militia in all cases of great and comprehensive urgency or danger.
A revision of the law respecting these valuable associations, is earnestly recommended. No other force being so œconomical, will it not be proper, in order to derive full and permanent utility from the volunteer companies in all hazardous conjunctures, that the power of the President to accept their patriotic offers of service should no longer be confined to a limited period, and that the duration only of their engagements, after acceptance, should be defined by law? Can a time, be fairly presumed to arrive, when we can have nothing to apprehend from either foreign or domestic enemies?
An omission in the law to provide the same compensation to the volunteer cavalry, for the use of their horses, that is allowed to militia cavalry, when in actual service, has been felt with some sensibility, by the former, who were employed during the last
insurrection in the same service with militia cavalry. It is therefore recommended, that an appropriation be made for compensating the volunteer cavalry so employed, for the use of their horses, during their service, at the same rates of allowance, which have been paid to the militia cavalry on the same service— and that equal rates of compensation for the future, shall be provided for both, by law, for the use of their horses in actual service.
The militia of the United States, ought to be considered as an essential arm of our defence, and a sure resource from which reinforcements may be drawn to supply deficiencies in the regular army, in the event of a sudden invasion, or the wasting progress of a long war.
To obtain their aid however, with celerity and order, in such cases, other provisions are necessary than are to be found at present in the laws.
The act of the 28th February, 1795, authorizes the President, whenever the United States shall be invaded or in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, to call forth such numbers of militia of the state, or states adjoining, most convenient to the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for the purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper.
To give effect to this power and enable the President to carry upon an enemy with promptitude the force nearest to, or best calculated to annoy him, it is indispensible that he should know the number and species of militia in each county of a state, and the names and places of residence of their officers respectively.
If these circumstances are not precisely known to the President, at the time the force is wanted, the delay which must necessarily intervene in the circuitous
course of orders and instructions, will often, if not always be productive of disastrous consequences. To avoid these, the proper officer of the militia, in each state, should be obliged, by heavy penalties, and high responsibility, to make quarterly returns to the Department of War, comprehending the aforesaid particulars.
The troops raised under and conformably to the provisions of "An act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," passed the 16th July, 1798, demand at this time particular attention.
This additional force was to consist of twelve regiments of infantry, and six troops of cavalry, the latter intended, with the two troops of cavalry heretofore and now in service, to form one regiment of cavalry. For the infantry the officers have been appointed, and the recruiting service some time in operation. For the cavalry the officers have also been appointed, but to avoid the expense of this kind of troops, which is always much greater than that of any species of foot, the recruiting service has not been ordered as yet, into operation, nor have horses been purchased, although preparatory measures have been taken.
For the twelve regiments of infantry the enlistments amount as follows, according to the last returns which have been received by the Department.
From the fifth regiment, which is the first of the twelve, there have been no returns.
Returned for the sixth regiment, enlisted in North Carolina, from August to December, 1799, viz. 134.
For the seventh, enlisted in Virginia, from May to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz. 258.
For the eighth, enlisted in Virginia, from May to October the 1st, 1799, viz. 424.
For the ninth, enlisted in Maryland, from May to September 17th, 1799, viz. 314.
For the tenth, enlisted in Pennsylvania, from May to August 1st, 1799, viz. 448.
For the eleventh, enlisted in New-Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware, from April to the first Monday in October, 1799, viz. 458.
For the twelfth, enlisted in New-York, from May to the first Monday in September, 1799, viz. 287.
For the thirteenth, enlisted in Connecticut, from May to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz. 371.
For the fourteenth, enlisted in Massachusetts, from May to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz. 327.
For the fifteenth, enlisted in Massachusetts, Maine, from June to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz. 145.
For the sixteenth, enlisted in New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island and Vermont, from July to the first Monday in November, 1799, viz. 233.
Total enlisted—3399.
Agreeably to the provisions of the act of the 16th July, 1798, all these troops have been, by the terms of their respective enlistments, engaged "for and during the continuance of the existing differences between the United States and the French republic."
The Secretary thinks it necessary to mention, that immediately upon the accommodation of the existing differences aforesaid, the engagements of all these troops will expire, and every man be entitled to demand his discharge. That in consequence, if it shall be deemed expedient to keep up a peace establishment more extended than heretofore, or any events should intervene to render a larger army indispensible, it will not be practicable to apply one of these men to the same, who have already received a bounty, without a re-inlistment and the expense of a new bounty.
It is therefore thought adviseable that the terms of enlistment, prescribed by the law, be superceded by a provision, in future, to enlist for the term of five years, if not sooner discharged. This modification
leaves with the President, the power of reducing the numbers of the army, at any time, to a prescribed establishment, and if the negociations of our envoys to the French republic shall be successful, it will procure a number of men, who without additional expense, can be retained if necessary in service for the period mentioned, a measure which appears equally recommended by its policy and œconomy.
The Secretary has before observed, that if the United States shall prevent an enemy from procuring the horses of the country, and maintain a superiority in horse-artillery, they will have little to fear from an invading enemy, however powerful in infantry. It certainly would be an important addition to our system of defence, was an arrangement devised to deprive an enemy, as much as possible, after he had effected a landing upon our coast, of the means of subsistence, and especially to prevent him from possessing himself of horses, indispensible to the transport of his baggage, stores and provisions, and for his artillery and cavalry.
An operation, promising to be so efficient, and sanctioned by experience in other countries, will perhaps require, on the part of government, a stipulation of indemnification to the individual, for the value of all stock and horses, which may be removed in consequence of invasion, if not restored to their respective owners.
Provisions and restrictions, it is conceived may be made, calculated to secure the public against frauds, and to encourage, at the same time, the aid of proprietors themselves, in the execution of such a law. It should explicitly provide, that no compensation will ever be allowed, for property of the kind described, destroyed either by the enemy, or by our own army, to prevent its falling into the hands of an enemy, in all cases, where it shall appear no previous preparation or exertion had been made use of to remove it, and
authorize the destruction of all stock, and horses in particular, left in an exposed situation, when necessary to prevent their being useful to an enemy, or employed against the armies of the United States.
The government of a country, blessed with every convenience for an extensive foreign trade, and peopled with inhabitants distinguished for their commercial spirit, will, from the natural operation of circumstances, and the impulse given by its citizens, consider it a duty to prepare, either gradually or promptly, as policy, interest or necessity may dictate, the means of affording protection to its property on the ocean.
We find, accordingly, the foundation of a navy already laid, and its advantages so far felt, as to induce a belief, its progress will be permitted to keep pace with the purposes for which it was instituted. This navy however, which is specially intended to protect trade, will in its turn require to be protected, when in harbour, by suitable fortifications. Without a place of safety, to which it may retire from a superior fleet, the labours and resources of years may be destroyed in a single hour.
The fortifications, erected for the defence of our cities and harbours, cannot yet be considered competent to afford this security. Many new and extensive works, even at those places where the fortifications are most advanced, will yet be required to render any of them a secure asylum for our navy.
Whenever therefore the harbours, in which our dock-yards and great naval deposits are to be established, and to which our navy may retire in time of war shall be determined upon, it will be indispensible to make them impregnable, if possible, to an enemy.
Schedule B, will shew the sums which have been appropriated, and annually expended, in fortifying our harbours, since the "Act to provide for the de-
fence of certain ports and harbours in the United States," passed the 20th March, 1794, and the balance remaining on the 1st October, 1799.
The Paymaster General of the armies of the United States, has been, agreeably to the provision of the 15th section of "An act for the better organizing of the troops of the United States, and for other purposes," quartered by direction of the late Commander in Chief, at the seat of government, it being the station deemed most proper to enable him to perform his functions with convenience, facility, and the least probable risk of the public monies.
The functions of this officer, are, by law, highly important; his trust is eminently responsible—All monies for the pay of the armies pass through his hands, including military bounties, and the subsistence and forage of officers, and he is the auditor in the first instance of all accounts for such objects.
The compensation provided for him is eighty dollars per month, with the rations and forage of a major. This compensation, the Secretary conceives, not merely inadequate to remunerate the duties and responsibility attached to the office, but insufficient for the decent support of a respectable character, and certainly none other should fill it.
It is therefore respectfully suggested, to increase the compensation to the Paymaster General of the armies of the United States, and submitted whether it might not be attended with some beneficial effects to vest him with a suitable brevet rank in the army.
The regularity, discipline and of course the efficiency of armies have always depended very essentially upon the system provided for their government. Impressed with this conviction, the Secretary takes the liberty to bring into your view "The rules and articles for the better government of the troops raised or to be raised, and kept in pay, by and at the expense of the United
States of America." This system contains many excellent provisions, but experience has produced a pretty general wish among military men, that it could be submitted to a complete revision, as in many particulars, it is presumed to require amendments.
This revision would be a very serious work, and there is reason to fear could not be undertaken, with a prospect of being speedily finished. Some things however can be done which would be important improvements.
A great obscurity envelopes the provisions of the existing articles, respecting the power to appoint or order general courts martial. One construction, by confining the power to the general or commander in chief only, is inconveniently narrow, and has occasioned too great delay, as well in instituting courts, as in giving effect to their sentences. Another construction, which has been practised upon, (commandants of posts, as such, of whatever grade, having assumed the power of constituting general courts martial) is too much diffused, and would place in too many hands a trust no less delicate than important.
To attempt to attain the proper medium by a more exact legislative definition of the characters who may exercise the power, would perhaps be attended with difficulty, and might often not meet the new situations which are constantly occurring in the infinite combinations of military service. The expedient which has appeared most proper, is to give a discretionary authority to the President, to empower other officers, (than those the soundest interpretation has decided to be designated by the articles of war, viz. generals or those on whom a general's command has devolved) to appoint general courts martial, under such circumstances, and with such limitations as he may deem adviseable.
The provisions which refer the determination, on
sentences extending to the loss of life, or the dismission of a commissioned officer in time of peace to the President, must no doubt have frequently been attended with perplexity to him, and are inconvenient, if not injurious to the service. It is scarcely possible, for any but the military commander, to appreciate duly the motives which in such cases demand severity or recommend clemency. To this an accurate view of all the circumstances of the army in detail is often necessary. The efficacy of punishment, when requisite in an army, depends much on its celerity, and must be greatly weakened by the unavoidable delay of a resort to the executive: during which delay, the mischief it was intended to remedy, may and sometimes most probably will have happened. The reasons mentioned induce an opinion, that it is expedient to empower the commanding general of an army, to decide upon, and cause to be executed when proper, all sentences of general courts martial, except only such as respect a general officer. The responsibility of the commanding general to the President, and to his country, must ensure a discreet exercise of the required authority, and its utility is manifest.
The best mode of treating the crime of desertion, has been an embarrassing investigation in most countries. To fix upon a punishment, that gives the surest promise of checking or preventing the evil, or which, when it does happen, in its application will be most analagous to the generally received opinions of a country, and the habits of military life, is indeed difficult. The same punishment ought not perhaps, to be applied to this crime, the most injurious to armies, and complicated in its nature, at all times and under all circumstances.
To punish it with death in time of peace, in all cases, would in this country do violence to the popular habits of thinking. Whipping is found to be in-
effectual. Confinement to hard labour, it is supposed, will produce more beneficial results, and courts martial have, in their discretion, been lately much influenced by this belief. As however our soldiers are enlisted for given periods, when an engagement is nearly expired, confinement would be an inadequate punishment, for it could not continue beyond the term of service, and although a soldier may be supposed to have fewer inducements to withdraw from an engagement, which is near terminating, yet it has sometimes happened, and may be expected in future, that men under such circumstances, have been the authors of combinations, to revolt, desert, and commit other crimes, consequently have been the most atrocious offenders; and it is known that they frequently have themselves deserted. To make this punishment then in time of peace, in all cases, commensurate with and proportioned to the crime, an auxiliary provision to extend the confinement and labour beyond the period of service the criminal had engaged for, would appear necessary. Such a provision would have a tendency, to render the sentences of the courts less sanguinary.
The Secretary by no means designs to suggest, that it would be proper to abolish the punishment of death for desertion even in time of peace. He considers that in aggravated and complicated cases, it would always be proper, and that in time of war or civil commotion, it should always be applied to this crime. He also inclines to the opinion, that the power of pardoning ought never to be extended in any instance of desertion, or an attempt to desert to enemies or traitors.
Connected with the perfection of our military establishment, is a code of well digested rules for the formations, field exercise, movements, and police of the different species of troops composing our army.
Major General Hamilton, has some time since been specially charged with this work. As it was not however expected that so extensive an undertaking could be completed without a subdivision of labour, and the co-operation of various talents and experience, he informs, that he has assigned to Major General Pinckney an important portion of the task. The execution, it is also understood, will require the aid of other and subordinate officers, for whose extra service a special compensation is suggested as being agreeable to usage, and essential to a cheerful and zealous performance of their duty. This, should it meet your approbation, demands no particular act of the Legislature.
There is another point relative to the army, which he has made the subject of a recent communication to the Department of War, to which it may be proper to request attention.
The General observes, that "The detaching from their corps, soldiers as servants to the various officers of the general staff, is productive of material inconvenience, by withdrawing altogether, from military service, a considerable number of persons; and occasioning dissatisfactions to the commandants of corps, who never see their men removed without uneasiness, and are sometimes much disgusted by the selection of those whom they are anxious to retain. There is no doubt, he adds, that it would operate beneficially, if after fixing the number of servants to which the several characters of the general staff should be entitled, they were to be allowed an equivalent in money, regulated by the cost of a soldier to the public, and were to be required to provide their own servants."
Should this measure be adopted, which is agreeable to an obsolete regulation of the Old Congress, penalties may be devised to secure a faithful execution, which, from the force of circumstances, would be very little liable to abuse.
When treating upon military subjects, it may not be improper to give a general view of the positions of the existing regular force, composing the armies of the United States, conformably to a disposition of the same, by your approbation and that of the late Commander in Chief.
The four regiments of infantry and the two companies of cavalry, on the permanent establishment, are disposed of as follow:
One regiment is assigned to the frontiers of Tennessee and Georgia. There are also, in that quarter, the two companies of cavalry.
The three other regiments are distributed along the lakes, from Niagara to Michilimackinac, upon the Miami, Ohio, Mississippi, and Tombigbee.
There is also one battalion of the artillerists and engineers distributed with the aforesaid troops.
This entire force is manifestly inadequate to the purposes it is intended to answer, on our northern, western, and southern frontiers.
The twelve regiments of infantry now raising, have taken, or are to take, the following provisional positions, viz.
Three of the twelve regiments of infantry in the vicinity of Providence river near Uxbridge, Massachusetts.
Three regiments in the vicinity of Brunswick, New-Jersey.
Three regiments in the vicinity of Potomac near Harper's ferry, Virginia.
Three regiments in the vicinity of Augusta, above the falls of Savannah.
This disposition, it is conceived, combines considerations relative to the discipline and health of the troops with the œconomical supply of their wants. It has also some military aspects; in the first instance, towards the security of Boston and Newport; in the
second, towards that of New-York and Philadelphia; in the third and fourth, towards that of Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah and the southern states generally, and in the third, particularly towards the reinforcement of the western army.
The residue of the two regiments of artillerists and engineers, except one battalion, stated to be on our northern, western, and southern frontiers, are stationed, in our sea-board fortifications, from Portland, Massachusetts, to the St. Mary's, Georgia. From these are to be drawn two battalions, in succession, for the army when in the field, with a view to a course of regular instruction.
Schedule C, exhibits the actual force (according to the latest returns) of the four regiments of infantry and two companies of cavalry, on the old establishment, and the two regiments of artillerists and engineers.
All which is respectfully submitted.
JAMES McHENRY,
SECRETARY OF WAR.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
*January 5th*, 1800.
A
ESTIMATE of the Pay, Forage, Subsistence and Clothing of a Regiment of Artillerists and Engineers, on the present Establishment.
[illustration: table with columns Pay per Month. | Pay per Year. | Forage per Month. | Forage per Year. | Rations per Day. | Value of Rations, yearly, at 17 cents per Ration. | Value of Clothing for Cadets, non-commissioned Officers, Musicians and Privates, at 25 Dollars per Suit. | Total Amount of Pay, Subsistence, Forage, and Clothing, for one Year.]
1 Lieutenant Colonel Commandant, — 75 | 900 | 12 | 144 | 6
4 Majors, - - - — 55 | 2,640 | 10 | 480 | 16
1 Adjutant, ) including their — 40 | 480 | 6 | 72 | 2
1 Quarter Master, { pay as Lieute- — 40 | 480 | 6 | 72 | 2
1 Paymaster, ) nants, — 40 | 480 | 6 | 72 | 2
1 Surgeon, - - - — 45 | 540 | 10 | 120 | 3
2 Surgeons' Mates, - - — 30 | 720 | 6 | 144 | 4
16 Captains, - - - — 40 | 7,680 | - | - | 48
32 Lieutenants, - - — 30 | 11,520 | - | - | 64
32 Cadets, - - - — 10 | 3,840 | - | - | 64
4 Sergeants Major, - — 10 | 480 | - | - | 4
4 Quarter Master Sergeants, - — 10 | 480 | - | - | 4
64 Sergeants, - - - — 8 | 6,144 | - | - | 64
64 Corporals, - - - — 7 | 5,376 | - | - | 64
1 Chief Musician, - - — 8 | 96 | - | - | 1
10 Musicians, - - - — 6 | 720 | - | - | 10
128 Artificers, - - - — 10 | 15,360 | - | - | 192
768 Privates, - - - — 5 | 46,080 | - | - | 768
*D.* 104,016 | *D.* 1104 | 1318 | *D.* 81,781 90 | *D.* 26,875 | *D.* 213,776 90
For two Regiments of Artillerists and Engineers, - - - *D.* 427,553 80
A
ESTIMATE of the Pay, Forage, Subsistence, and Clothing of a Regiment of Artillery, on the proposed Peace Establishment.
[illustration: table with columns Pay per Month. | Pay per Year. | Forage per Month. | Forage per Year. | Rations per Day. | Value of Rations for one Year, at 17 Cents per Ration. | Value of Clothing for Cadets, Non-Commissioned Officers, Musicians and Privates, at 25 Dollars per Suit. | Total Amount of Pay, Subsistence, Forage, and Clothing, for one Year.]
1 Lieutenant Colonel Commandant, — 75 | 900 | 12 | 144 | 6
3 Majors, - - - — 55 | 1,980 | 10 | 360 | 12
1 Adjutant, ) including their — 40 | 480 | 6 | 72 | 2
1 Quarter Master, { pay as Lieute- — 40 | 480 | 6 | 72 | 2
1 Paymaster, ) nants, — 40 | 480 | 6 | 72 | 2
1 Surgeon, - - - — 45 | 540 | 10 | 120 | 3
2 Surgeons' Mates, - - — 30 | 720 | 6 | 144 | 4
12 Captains, - - - — 40 | 5,760 | - | - | 36
24 Lieutenants, - - — 30 | 8,640 | - | - | 48
24 Cadets, - - - — 10 | 2,880 | - | - | 48
3 Sergeants Major, - — 10 | 360 | - | - | 3
3 Quarter Master Sergeants, - — 10 | 360 | - | - | 3
48 Sergeants, - - - — 8 | 4,608 | - | - | 48
48 Corporals, - - - — 7 | 4,032 | - | - | 48
1 Chief Musician, - - — 8 | 96 | - | - | 1
12 Musicians, - - - — 6 | 864 | - | - | 12
130 Artificers, - - - — 10 | 15,600 | - | - | 195
650 Privates, - — 5 | 39,000 | - | - | 650
For one Regiment, — | 87,780 | 984 | 1123 | 69,682 15 | 22,975 | 181,421 15
2
For two Regiments, - - - - - - 362,842 30
A
ESTIMATE of the Pay, Subsistence and Forage of the proposed Corps of Engineers, including the Clothing for the Cadets.
[illustration: table with columns Pay per Month. | Pay per Year. | Forage per Month. | Forage per Year. | Rations per Day. | Year's Value of Rations, at 17 Cents per Ration. | Value of Cadets' Clothing at 31 Dollars and 25 Cents per Suit. | Total.]
2 Lieutenant Colonels, - — 75 | 1,800 | 11 | 288 | 12
3 Majors, - - - — 55 | 1,980 | 10 | 360 | 12
12 Captains, - - - — 40 | 5,760 | - | - | 36
48 Lieutenants, - - — 30 | 17,280 | - | - | 96
24 Cadets, - - - — 10 | 2,880 | - | - | 48
— | 29,700 | | 648 | | 12,658 20 | 750 | 43,756 20
Cost of two Regiments of Artillery, on the present establishment, for one year, - - - - - 427,553 80
Cost of two Regiments for one year, on the proposed establishment, — 362,842 30
Annual expense of the proposed Corps of Engineers, — 43,756 20
——— 406,598 50
Saving in favour of proposed establishment, - *Dalls.* 20,955 30
B
STATEMENT of Monies applied to the Defence of certain Ports in the United States, in pursuance of the "Act to provide for the Defence of certain Ports and Harbours in the United States," passed the 20th March, 1794, distinguishing the Monies expended in each Year, from and after the passing of the said Act, upon the Fortifications of each Harbour, to the first Day of October, 1799.
[illustration: table with columns 1794. | 1795. | 1796. | 1797. | 1798. | 1799. | Total.]
Portland, - - - — 1,275 41 | 1,791 | 1,369 | 1,068 25 | 1,200 | 4,264 6 | 10,967 72
Portsmouth, - - - — 1,615 80 | 2,266 | 316 | - | 1,000 | - | 5,197 80
Salem, - - - — 1,723 08 | 1,000 | - | - | - | 2,000 | 4,723 08
Marblehead, - - - — 1,963 78 | 2,011 68 | 1,508 87 | 114 84 | - | 6,000 | 11,599 17
Gloucester, - - - — 2,258 39 | 1,000 | 1,280 27 | - | - | - | 4,538 66
Boston, - - - — 496 27 | 1,342 50 | - | - | - | - | 1,838 77
Newport, - - - — 6,383 33 | 5,281 22 | 198 91 | - | 5,900 | 50,000 | 67,763 46
New-London, - - - — 5,437 36 | 1,144 73 | 200 85 | - | - | 7,520 | 14,302 94
New-York, - - - — 13,737 73 | 11,866 54 | 1,124 | - | 30,117 24 | 30,116 18 | 86,961 69-
Philadelphia, - - - — 9,187 86 | 6,658 | 14,991 31 | 23,201 87 | 51,365 44 | 43,503 32 | 148,907 80
Baltimore, - - - — 6,086 49 | 6,922 09 | 2,802 23 | 2,347 41 | 18,022 72 | 4,468 51 | 40,649 45
Annapolis, - - - — 2,997 75 | 268 50 | - | - | - | - | 3,200 25
Norfolk, - - - — 9,019 52 | 7,873 95 | 1,286 23 | 3,000 | - | 402 | 21,581 70
Alexandria, - - - — 3,728 36 | 1,208 | - | - | - | - | 4,936 36
Cape Fear River and Ocracock, — 4,275 2 | 5,334 49 | 1,430 95 | - | - | 5,333 33 | 16,373 79
Beacon Island, - - - — 1,816 49 | - | - | - | - | - | 1,816 49
Charleston, - - - — 10,471 94 | 11,265 45 | 8,027 6 | 5,413 3 | 4,205 98 | 11,500 | 50,883 46
George Town, - - - — 250 | 572 54 | - | - | - | - | 822 54
Savannah, - - - — 2,641 74 | 2,086 | 3,330 30 | - | - | - | 8,058 4
St. Mary's, - - - — 1,192 73 | 2,000 | 2,000 | - | - | 2,000 | 7,192 73
*Dolls.* 512,381 90
Remaining unexpended of the 620,000 dollars appropriated by the several acts of Congress, — 107,618 10
*Dolls.* 620,000
C
STATEMENT of the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers, Musicians and Privates in the two Companies of Cavalry, two Regiments of Artillerists and Engineers, and four old Regiments of Infantry, taken from the last Returns.
Cavalry, - - - — 116
Artillerists, - - - — 1501
Infantry, - - - — 1812
Total, — 3,429
Type
Printed Document
Description
Report detailing necessary improvements to the current military system. Advocates for a standing army and necessary fortifications and education systems to produce and maintain said military.
Date
01/05/1800
Author
Collection
Document number
1800010500001
Page start
1
Notable persons
James McHenry
John Adams
Secretary of War
President
Senate
House of Representatives
committee
Notable locations
War Department

