[(Duplicate)] [Encl 8 April 1799] [L] 180 N^o: 17. London Jan^y 10. 1799. Dear Sir, The situation of S^t Domingo having on repeated consideration appeared to me to be likely materially to affect certain great interests of the United States, and consequently to require of them a comprehensive as well as cautious policy to protect those interests, and to turn to profit if possible the changes, of which the independence of S^t Domingo is the forerunner, I went some days since to Lord Grenville and after stating to him my reflections upon this subject, observed that the principal motive that led me to submit them to him, was in order to ascertain his opinion, whether it would not be of great and mutual benefit that we should act in concert as well in respect to the present as the expected condition of this important Island. He could best decide the advantages and disadvantages which they were likely to expect from the emancipation of that colony. With regard to us we had to apprehend some inconveniences from the influence of the example upon our slaves in the Southern States, and it would be incumbent upon us to pursue such measures as should promise security against, and if practicable, effectually prevent the depredations and piracy upon our trade, to be apprehended, should S^t Domingo become the resort and asylum of buccaneers and rovers. We had never attempted to foment insurrections among our neighbors, nor to persuade the colonies near us to throw off their allegiance. But we should neglect what we owe to ourselves, if in the present case; and in others which may be like it, we did not adopt such measures as should seem best calculated, not only to render them harmless, but as far as possible to make them beneficial to us. What those measures would be, it was not possible for me to form an opinion; but that they and we should take care not to embarrass each other, and so disappoint the views of both, appeared to me very plain. Lord Grenville said that it seemed highly probable that S^t Domingo would become independent, and that he entirely agreed in the opinion I had expressed in respect to the policy and advantage of a concert of measures between them and us. At present they had not formed any distinct views on that head; the late engagements of himself and colleagues in parliament had delayed the business, but they were then engaged in the consideration of the subject, which in a variety of lights they thought an important one: That Colonel Grant had not yet gone out, and would be detained until they had come to some further determinations upon the object of his mission. That they desired to secure their colonies from the influence of the example of S^t Domingo, and to prevent the existence of a new Barbary of power in that quarter of the world. They moreover had it in view to propose to Toufsaint to put the trade upon such a footing as might afford to him the supplies that he should require, and at the same time guard against the mischiefs that they and we desire to prevent. That he had thought of an exclusive company, composed jointly of British and American subjects; that the idea had not been examined; and that as soon as he had more fully considered the subject, he would invite me to meet him and his colleagues for the purpose of considering it. The foregoing is the outline and substance of our first conversation, in the course of which other things were said, not however of sufficient importance to be repeated. The following queries and their answers are exceptions to this remark. I asked Lord Grenville, if the independence of S^t Domingo must not inevitably have a great influence upon Jamaica and the other Islands? He answered that certainly it must. Must it not be soon, notwithstanding all your vigilance, followed by the abolition of the whole colony system in that quarter of the world? The colony system must fall to the ground; we have foreseen it, and nothing remains but to postpone it as long as possible, and to employ such measures as seem best adapted to diminish the evils of the event when it arrives; and I have no reserve, added his Lordship in saying, that in whatever we do we must act in harmony with you. Last evening I received a letter from Lord Grenville, a copy of which and of the enclosed minute are annexed; and according to his Lordship's invitation I met him and his colleagues this morning. The conference began by my saying that before I made any observations upon our present equivocal situation in regard to France, or upon the divisions of the trade between us and them as proposed in the minute, I ought to express my belief that the plan would be objected as well on account of the general unpopularity of monopolies in America, as on the score of a defect of power in Congress to create an exclusive corporation for the purposes of trade, such a power is not expressly given, and if it exists must be taken by inference from powers which are distinctly given. Questions of this sort are liable to much debate, and in this case would perhaps be opposed by some who might think the power exists, but dislike monopolies. Besides our merchants are numerous and full of enterprise, and no way has suggested itself, by which a limited number of them could without undue preference be selected to compose the company. In respect to the proposed division of the trade between us and them, I said that the distinction in the supplies seemed plain and natural enough; but there would be articles supplied to S^t Domingo, not of their manufacture nor of our production, such as wines, brandies, nankeens and probably other commodities that did not occur, in respect to which it might be agreed that such articles should be supplied by either. In regard to our situation with France it was easier to say what it is not, than what it really is, and I could only express my hope that it may soon become less doubtful and better defined. M^r Pitt observed that it would be presumptuous in a stranger to give an opinion upon the powers given to Congress by our constitution, which possibly were not as large as we might find to our advantage that they should be; but the present case was of great strength, and the mischiefs with which we were menaced were such, that it would be singular indeed if an adequate power did not exist to guard against them. Our Southern States were open to the emissaries of S^t Domingo, and perhaps all things considered, it was not stating it too widely to say that we had as much or more to apprehend, than they had, from S^t Domingo becoming the resort and refuge of buccaneers and pirates. If the proposed project affords a fair probability of preventing these evils, it would be unfortunate, that it should fail from a defect of power in Congress; and perhaps we should think it expedient in that case to refer the plan to the respective States for their confirmation. In respect to the articles not of the growth or manufacture of either country it will, said M^r Pitt, be best to divide the supply between us in some equitable and [strikethrough: cannot] convenient; betraying to my apprehension, a fear of an open competition. Lord Grenville, after making several observations [strikethrough: explanatory] of the minute he had sent me, asked what other plan could be devised, that would be likely to avoid the objections, which I had suggested, and which would secure the principal objects in view. I replied that if it should turn out that Congress had not the power, or were unwilling to erect an exclusive commercial company, the powers to form treaties and to regulate trade with foreign nations were expressly given, and under them in the shape of treaties and laws, we could establish such regulations as our interest and safety and those of our friends should require. Going upon the idea of the entire independence of S^t Domingo, we and they might form treaties with Toufsaint by which it should be agreed, that the citizens of the United States and the subjects of G. Britain alone should trade to that Island. These treaties might contain such special stipulations relative to the particular ports of trade — the coasting vessels to be employed between these ports — the supplies which should or should not be carried there — emigrations — the suppression of privateers and all such other points, as may suggest themselves, upon a full consideration of the question. [Encl. 8 April 1799] [L] 180b A convention might likewise be made between the United States and G. Britain that should prescribe the regulations to be observed by each, in carrying on this trade which should be open to all the subjects of the two countries. This convention to be valid when laws confirming and providing for the execution of its stipulations should be enacted by the legislatures of both nations — these regulations might be as minute and extensive as the various objects to be attained should require. Lord Grenville made several objections to this plan, grounded upon the insecurity there would be in inforcing the observance of the requisite regulations, when the trade should be open to all the people of our two countries. M^r Pitt appeared less decided on this point, and acquiesced, as they all did, in my observation, that concert in this business between us and them was on many accounts of the first importance; that if the best plan was inconsistent with concert, one must be devised that will secure this primary object, and as many others as possible; and that the more liberal the terms were in respect to Toufsaint, the more advantageous the connection would be to the Inhabitants of S^t Domingo, and the less likely to be defeated by the instigation of emissaries. I asked what probability there was, that Toussaint would agree to a plan that should leave him but a limited independence? M^r Dundas replied, that taking all their information together, he thought it quite probable that Toussaint would consent, and with respect to his intentions, he had told one of their officers lately returned, that he would throw off [undecipherable] if he could be supported. It was remarked that something must be done immediately. I replied that I could see no objection to Colonel Grant's going forward according to their first intentions. He might open the plan to Toussaint and state the difficulties likely to exist against its adoption by the U. States, that whatever should be agreed upon between Toufsaint and G. Britain should be open for the accession of the U. States, and also open to such modifications as should enable the U. States to become a party, in case they decline or are unable to agree to the proposed plan; that full information should be given to the President thro' me, as well as by Lord Grenville thro' M^r Liston, with the assurance that G. Britain desires the co-operation of the U. States and will agree in such equitable commercial stipulations, as shall be compatible with the attainment of the principal objects they have in view in respect to their colonies. To this Lord Grenville and his colleagues assented, and the conference ended with the suggestion, that perhaps the President would think it advisable to send some person to join Colonel Grant in settling the arrangements with Toufsaint. This is a subject that merits [strikethrough: and] deliberate and extensive consideration. Whatever we do should be done as well with a view to the present colony system, as to future events still more important than the present. It is certain that G. Britain desires to act with us, and we may be sure of her co-operation, if we will concur in her plans; she will [strikethrough: also] risk something to obtain our concurrence; but she will act without us in case we disagree as to the terms of a joint co-operation. We also can act without her, and should, as she undoubtedly does, balance the advantages and disadvantages of a separate and joint negotiation. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, D^r Sir, your obed^t and faithful Serv^t Rufus King. The Secretary of State &c &c &c [endorsement, rotated: Copy of M^r King's Letter / to the Sec[retary of] State / [undecipherable]]