[XLVIII 270] War office 14 March 1798 The Sec^y. of war, respectfully submits the following result of his reflections, on the questions propounded yesterday by the President. 2. Will it be advisable to present immediately to Congress, the choice of the communications from our ministers in France, with the exception of the names of the persons employed by the Minister Talleyrand, to exhibit and enforce his requisitions for a bribe, under an injunction of secrecy as to that particular? From the Sec^y's. recollection of the communication from our ministers, it appears, that the Directory, among other things, require, 1^st. A bribe for their minister and four of their corps, of 50,000 £^stg. 2^d A Loan, for national purposes, equivalent to the amount of the value of the cargoes of american vessels, which have been captured, as [underline: prerequisites] to their agreeing to a suspension of their orders to capture our vessels. These conditions being such as the U.S. ought not to consent to; the second especially as involving in its nature a violation of our neutrality, or a war with England, and there not appearing any reasonable ground to expect better conditions will be offered, a full disclosure therefore to Congress of the requirements and disposition of the Directory, seems, under all the circumstances of the case, to be advisable and proper. There are objections no doubt to making this disclosures. It may be supposed 1. To affect the personal safety of our ministers. 2. As an insurmountable obstacle to any future negotiations with the men whose depravity it thus exposes. 3^d. As premature, inasmuch, as another effort was to be made by our ministers, and as the shipwreck of the Directory's project against England, must happen in the mean time, and incline them to reasonable terms of accommodation with this country. To the first objection it may be answered. That the agents of the French minister required, that their names only, not their propositions should be concealed. That the Sec^y. recollects no expression in the letters of our ministers to the Sec^y. of State, or any of their friends, which indicated an expectation on their part, that their communication to to the Executive should not be laid before Congress with the aforesaid exception. It must moreover be well known to the aforesaid minister, Talleyrand, and the Directory, that a bribe of 50,000 £^stg. could not be obtained without a reference of the subject to Congress. On the whole, it is to be presumed, as our ministers have suggested no precautions on this point, that they apprehended, should they remain in Paris, no personal restraints from the naked truth being told to Congress, [strikethrough: and] they thought the conjuncture demanded that they should hazard something for the public good. As to the 2^d Objection. This no doubt is deserving of attention. The men who rule in the Directory will it is probable use their influence to continue in it to may be successful. But be this as it may, it will not be the President who will divulge the requisition of the French minister for himself and the Directory, if it should come to be [strikethrough: known], publickly known, but the Congress, to whom he will recommend its being kept a secret. With respect to the 3^d Objection. It It cannot with propriety be called a premature act to lay before Congress the proceedings of our ministers as far as known, in one of the most important transactions which can affect the U.S. Neither can it be fairly characterized as in[strikethrough: expen] [strikethrough: or mucilitate] to submit the extraordinary demands of the Directory's agents [strikethrough: also] when it appears, [strikethrough: by our emanates] [interlineated above: our ministers] that notwithstanding [interlineated above: our ministers] had projected another experiment to be formally heard, yet that they [interlineated above: the above] determination entertained, on the 8 of Jan^y, [strikethrough: following] of its proving successful. So far therefore, as this opinion is to guide, no new or more favourable propositions are to be looked for on the part of the directory, from this experiment. 2. Ought the President then, to recommend in his message an immediate declaration of war? Seeing that France has qualified her hostility, and made no discrimination between the U.S. and other neutral nations, as it respects their Trade, and that she holds out terms of accommodation, tho' humiliating and inadmissable in their present nature and [14 Mar. 1798] [XLVIII 270b] and form, it would seem more conformable to such a state of things, to an apparent pending negotiation and probable or possible events in Europe, were the President to recommend a qualified hostility, or a vigorous [underline: defensive plan] competent to meet and maintain open hostility, instead of an immediate declaration of war. Such a proceeding as this, while it secures the objects [interlineated above: open] chiefly and preparatory to a state of war, involves in it the fewest evils, and the greatest number of possible chances and advantages. Taking this ground therefore, as the least exception able and safest, under all circumstances, it follows. That the President should inform Congress by message, couched in a firm & Temperate stile of the ill-success of the attempt to negotiate, lament the circumstance, advert to all the leading points that may be made public, and refer to an accompanying confidential commu- -nication communication for other particulars attending it. That he should declare, that the situation in which the country is placed by this [strikethrough: crisis] unexpected event, demands the most decisive measures, as well to meet present and increased aggressions, as to provide against more formidable and eventual dangers, and show to the world, that while, we seek peace, we are determined to encounter the last state of hostility rather than relinquish our honour, our dignity and right to self government and Independence. That the following may be noticed among the measures which will require the deliberations of Congress. That as France has formally violated and set aside the treaties between her and this country, they ought to be formally suspended by the U.S, since the observance of them on one side and not on the other, can only serve to produce inconveniences, and [270 c] and embarrassment. That the decree proposed by the Directory to capture our vessels, and a total change in circumstances, and relations by treaties between France and this country, renders it expedient that the merchants should be no longer restrained from exercising the right to arm to protect their property; That to this end, the President will annul the circular letter on this subject, and therefore submits it to Congress to prescribe such regulations and penalties in the case as may be thought proper and necessary. [strikethrough: That a power should be given to] That a further naval protection to the trade than can be afforded by this measure and the frigates seems indispensable. That a power should be given to provide and equip, at such time and by such means as may be judged best, a number of ships of the line and sloops of war for convoys and the security of our coast and harbours. That