[No 58.] [From Major General Knox, Secretary of War] War department August 16.^th 1793 Sir, Your letters of the 20.^th of June and the 2. and 10^th July with their several enclosures have been received and submitted to the President of the United States. Nothing further has been received from the Commissioners since my letters to you of the 26. Ultimo; excepting the letter from M^r Wilson dated at Detroit the 8.^th July, and from John Parish at the same place on the 9^th July, both of which are enclosed. The result of the Treaty thus remaining doubtful, the arrangements for your collateral force are still to proceed, as well as all other preparations which will not be inconsistent with the safety of the Commissioners and the faith plighted agreably to my letter to you of the 26^th of July which must be rigidly observed. You seem in your letter of the 2. July to complain of some inconsistancy in your orders from this Office. But I beleive a candid review of those orders will evince that such is not the case. In my letter to you of the 13^th of April it is stated "That the Commissioners will set out from this place about the first of May, they will probably be at Niagara about the 26.^th of the same month, and at lower Sandusky the place of Treaty about the first of June — they will be instructed most pointedly to inform you the earliest moment of the result of the Treaty whatever it may be." "As the Commissioners will be unprotected by Troops their lives may depend upon an absolute restraining of all hostile or offensive operations during the Treaty — For most indubitably if any incursions into Indian Country should be made, while the Treaty is progressing the Commissioners would be sacrificed." "It may therefore be highly proper that you should issue a proclamation informing of the Treaty and forbiding all persons whatever from making any incursions into the Indian Country until the event of the Treaty shall be known and permission given for that purpose. "The same principle will dictate peculiar caution in any demonstrations of Stores or Magazines, which you may deposit at the head of your line, and particularly it will preclude any considerable accumulation of Troops at your advanced posts." "Every preparation will be made upon your part, if the result of the Treaty should be unfavorable, to act with the highest vigor. Among these preparations the discipline of the Troops will doubtless not be the least. the success of our arms — the honor of the Army — and your own reputation will materially depend upon this circumstance that the President rests with the fullest confidence upon this point, the progress of which has hitherto given him great satisfaction." In my letter of the 20^th of April it is mentioned "That all possible caution and vigilance agreably to my letter of the 13.^th be observed to prevent the incursion of any parties of Whites towards the Indian Country during the Continuance of the Treaty and until further permission from you." "That the Commissioners are instructed to use every exertion to bring the Treaty to a close on or before the first of August next, so that in case of an unsuccessful issue, you may have time to carry on your operations" The letter of the 17.^th of May has nothing inconsistent with the original instruction contained in the before recited extract of my letter of the 13.^th of April, nor indeed has any subsequent letter. The Idea has been given to you that no movements should be undertaken which would endanger the Commissioners, [strikethrough: frustrate] the Treaty, or be inconsistent with good faith. But every other preparation has been ordered and the means left to your own direction, so that you might with a superior force move as early as possible, after receiving a letter from the Commissioners or me of the Treaty being broken off. It is not the intention of Government to perplex or embarrass you, but on the contrary to aid you in the highest degree in every thing to bring the war to an Honorable close, provided the result of the Treaty should render it absolutely necessary to have Recourse to the Sword. It was therefore the letter of the 17.^th of May was written investing you with plenary powers upon the objects with which you were Charged. It was and is intended that in case of an unsuccessful Treaty, that you should be the judge whether the objects pointed out as defined by the Government were or were not practicable, and if practicable, that you should be master of the means necessary to the end. The President of the United States confides therefore the whole business to you with this restriction however that no step be taken inconsistent with the safety of the Commissioners or the implied promises to the Indians. I transmit you a list of all the Stores forwarded from this City. You will find by the enclosed invoices of Stores sent from Pittsburgh that an ample quantity of hospital Stores left that place for Head Quarters the 17^th Ult.^o The remainder of the Clothing is forwarded as fast as it is possible to procure Waggons for the purpose. It is presumed that you would not deliver the Clothing except in cases of necessity, until the Autumna; especially to the old Troops who did not receive theirs the last year until the Winter Season. You will find by the papers enclosed that M^r Morrisons information of the detention of the Stores at Shippensburg could not have been accurate as those Stores were all delivered at Pittsburgh on or before the 9^th Ultimo. The President has given your proposition for a collateral expedition from the upper parts of the Ohio to the Rapids of the Miami a serious consideration, and the result is that he cannot at present concur therein for the following reasons. 1. The extreme difficulty or rather impossibility under the circumstances which do, and more than probably will exist of so timing such an expedition as to be in precise measure with the advance of your Army — The least derangement in time proceeding from tardiness in seting the Volunteers from Kentucky or the impossibility of communicating with the Army would probably subject the party forming such an expedition to utter destruction as they might have to encounter the whole force of the Savages — and all intelligence of their movements will be out of the question.