[Septem. 12. 1790 The Secretary of War to Gov. St Clair] I have not been unmindful of the suggestion you made . . . at the moment of your departure from this City relative to the establishment of a post at the Miami Village, in the event of the proposed expeditions succeeding in a certain degree. — I have had a full communication on the subject with the President of the United States, to whom you had previously made the same suggestion, and the following ideas are the result thereof, and will serve for the direction of yourself and Brigadier General Harmar on the occasion. In contemplating the establishment of Military Posts north-west of the Ohio, to ensure the purposes of awing the Indians reaching on the Wabash, the north end of Lake Erie, St Josephs and the Illinois, as much as Indians can be awed by Posts, and at the same time exhibiting a respectable appearance to the British Troops at Detroit and Niagara, the Miami Village presents itself as Superior to any other position, excepting the actual possession of the Posts in the Lakes — which ought to have been given up conformably to the treaty of peace. — This opinion was given to me by the President in the year 1789, and has several times been held forth by me to Brigadier General Harmar. But at the same time it must be acknowledged, that the measure would involve a much larger military establishment than perhaps the nature of the object or the dispositions of the United States would justify — and that it would be so opposed to the inclinations of the Indians generally, even with the tribes with whom we have made treaties, as to bring on inevitably an Indian War of some duration. — In addition to which, it may be supposed that the British Garrisons would find themselves so many with such a force impending over them, as not only to occasion considerable reinforcement of their upper Posts, but to occasion their furnishing, freely at least, the opposition of the Indians. — The proposed expedition is intended to exhibit to the Wabash Indians our power to punish them for their hostile depredations for their conniving at the depredations of others, and for their refusing to treat with the United States when invited thereto. — This power will be demonstrated by a sudden stroke, by which their Towns and Crops may be destroyed. — The principal means used will be the militia. — Let us suppose the expedition to be successful, as I pray God it may, and let us estimate the force which would be fully required for establishing a post at the Miami Village. From the mode of Indian fighting, it will not be reasonable to conclude that their force will be greatly reduced, in the [undecipherable] they may have with Brigadier General Harmar or Major [undecipherable]. If therefore eleven hundred Warriors, according to your judgement delivered to me, could be brought into activity from the Wabash and its vicinity, to which may be added a much greater number if we should suppose that the Wyandots, Delawares, St Josephs and Illinois Indians should be combined with them, the post to be established ought not to have a less garrison than 750 men — were it inferior to this number it would always be liable to be invested, and to have its supplies cut off, even when arrived in its vicinity. — Whether the Posts of communication, essentially necessary to the existence of the Miami Post should be up the Wabash, up the Miami of the Ohio, or the Miami of Lake Erie, they would require at different places at least 500 more. — To establish the Post in the first instance so as to render it Superior to the Indian force in the neighbourhood, would require all the troops employed on the expedition to amount to 2000. — Fear of a Sudden Stroke by which the attention and force of the Indians should be divided would require that number. The necessity of establishing a post and erecting fortifications at the Miami Village in the heart of the Indian Country, would require the same or a Superior number. — as the Indians would then have one object of their attention and exertion. To complete the works at the Post, and the essential communications to it would require probably two months. Should the militia stay for that period? — If so, would a part of them remain in garrison afterwards for five months, for the four hundred Continental troops to be employed on the expedition would be utterly inadequate for all the services required. — Besides, the Post could not be established unless it had a number of pieces of Cannon, and a proper quantity of Stores, and also three months provisions in the first instance. The transportation of these articles would require considerable time and a great apparatus. — It might be added further — That altho the establishment of a Strong Post at the Miami Village would awe the Indians, yet experience has demonstrated that posts will not prevent the depredations of small parties against the frontiers. — To render the measure entirely effectual, and at the same time to guard the public lands from intrusion, the regular forces to be employed North West of the Ohio, ought to be increased to 1800 men. — This establishment would not be compatible with the public views on the public finances, unless it is absolv'd from mere necessity. — due consideration therefore of these several circumstances, renders the measure at this period inexpedient and therefore not to be undertaken. — The expedition will either incline the Indians to treat of peace, or it will induce them to wage open war in the ensuing Spring. — A further time is also required to know the intentions of the British Court respecting the delivery of Niagara & Detroit. The decision of this point has an intimate connection with the peace of the frontiers. — The ultimate determination of Government must therefore depend on the results of the arrangements which have been directed, and which are in operation. — It would not be wise to direct a measure, which would give a wrong bias to affairs. — The President will be exceedingly desirous to learn the measures taken by yourself and Brigadier General Harmar, from time to time, and above all he is exceedingly anxious that every arrangement should be made to render the proposed expedition entirely effectual. —