Author's Letterbook Copy

Wayne's Campaign Strategy

Wayne explains in detail his strategy for the campaign against the Indians who he insists are being aided, behind the scenes, by the British. He argues against a Fall campaign because his troops are not adequately trained or supplied and the Indians are strongest in the Fall and weakest in the Spring.

1792

08

24

Pittsburgh

Cited in Wayne to Knox, 08/24/1792 and in Knox to Wayne, 09/01/1792.

Cited document addressed to the War Office

Henry Knox

Anthony Wayne

Indians

hostile Indians

savages

British

British Ambassador

agents

spies

Five Nations

Lord Dorchester

King George

General Clerk

Prince Edward

British Viceroy

General Putnam

raw troops

Congress

mounted volunteers

enemy

Captain Brant

councils

women and children

Legion

Light Corps of the Legion

our Indians

guides

scouts

dragoons

cavalry

General Wilkinson

riflemen

dismounted Dragoons

Quartermaster General

James O'Hara

Kentucky volunteers

escorts

General StClair

General St Clair

Pittsburgh

posts

lakes

our posts on the Lakes

Great Britain

United States

Canada

Indian lands

Lake Erie

Presque Isle

Presqueisle

Fort Washington

Fort Jefferson

Big Beaver River

Cahoga River

frontier

Sandusky

Miami villages

St Josephs River

prairies

Miami River

wilderness

Atlantic states

middle states

Big Beaver

Fort Hamilton

Grean Kenhawa

Point Pleasant

Whelen

Whelan

Indian country

frontier counties of Pennsylvania and Virginia

plan of operations

massacre

flags

independence

boundary

campaign

expeditions

corn

venison

game

maneuvers

magazine

forage

stores

provisions

pasture

councils

forts

breastworks

abbatis

baggage

expense

horse

oats

corn

hay

rifle clothing

Indian meal

handmill

supplies

boats

clover

timothy hay

recruiting

grain

war

boundary disputes

seasons

all that can be expected from us, under present circumstances, will be to endeavor to protect the frontiers and raise, discipline and manoeuvure the troops in a manner suited to the service for which they are intended

wanton and deliberate massacre of our flags

idle predjudice

temporary peace

sophistry of British Ambassadors, agents or state spies

an imaginary boundary between Great Britain and the United States

one foot of your lands

a right to a single inch of it without your consent

a Country within the acknowledged limits of the United States

some reasons against a fall campaign

another defeat with raw troops

one or two desultory expeditions

ample and proper magazines of forage

several new towns of hostile Indians

safety of their women and children

authority to make these arrangements

my reputation as an officer

the effects of a nocturnal charge

our superiority in the field

auxiliaries to the regular Dragoons

1792082453555

67

7

To Major Genl Knox Secy of War
Pittsburgh 24th Augt 1792
Sir
Previously to entering into a detail or plan of operations against the hostile indians I beg leave to offer a few general observations why I think the war must progress.
The savages have become confident, haughty and insolent from reiterated success, - which they have recently evinced by the wanton & deliberate massacre of our flags: an enormity that can't be suffered to pass with impunity - unless the United States of America will sacrifice national character & justice to idle prejudice - & mean oeconomy - in order to patch up a temporary peace, which can neither be honorable, expedient, or permanent under present circumstances and impressions; particularly whilst the British are in possession of our posts on the Lakes for tho they may not directly, I am convinced that they do, indirectly stimulate the savages to continue the war: nor can all the sophistry of British Embassadors, agents of State spies convince me of the contrary. - until they surrender up those posts, especially after seeing & reading deliberate attention the treaty held with those very indians, and with part of the Five nations about this time last year by Lord Dorchester, I acknowledge that there was a kind of peaceable idea held out to the savages - toward America, but sophistical and insidious to an excess: however there was part of his Lordships language that was plain & decisive. - I think it was to this effect "When the King your Father granted independance to America he only marked out an imaginary boundary between Great Britain and the United States, as far as related to themselves to take place when America should comply with certain conditions: But he never granted them one foot of your lands; nor have the Americans, or any other power a right to a single inch of it without your consent even if the treaty had been fully complied with on the part of America, but it has not, nor will the posts be given up until every thing is fully complied with. The King your father will never forget you: he has ordered me to take care of you - General Clerk, who I leave in command has the same orders - and Prince Edward the Son of the King your father has lately arrived with a chosen band of warriors - He is second in command & he will take care of you."
Such was the language Sir, that the British viceroy, held with the hostile and other indians residing in, and inhabiting a Country, within the acknoledged limits of the United States, in August 1791, and which to me is very conclusive evidence, that if they dont actually encourage the indians to continue the war - they promise to protect them. I have been thus narrative and minute - in order to shew the reason why I think the war will progress - and at the same time to shew why I can't agree in opinion with General Putnam, that we ought to carry on part of our operations by the way of Lake Erie. Because I believe that the British would with avidity, avail themselves of that pretext to assist the savages openly. - at all events they would prevent us from navigating on that water as long as they hold possession of our posts: otherwise I certainly should be most decidedly in favor of a combined operation by water from Presque Isle and by land from Fort Washington, Jefferson & Ca - and were it proper at this time to shew why I prefer the route by the way of Presque Isle I could advance strong & conclusive reasons in favour of this route in preference to that by the way of big Beaver and Cahahoga rivers - but that being out of the question at present I will take the liberty to offer some reasons against a fall campaign - especially that immediately ensuing.
Because we shall be pressed for time and deficient in point of numbers, discipline and manoeuvre - and because, we ought not risk another defeat with raw troops: all that can reasonably be expected from us, under present circumstances, will be to endeavour to protect the frontiers, and to raise, disciple and manoeuvre the troops in a manner suited to the service for which they are intended. - this business without exertion & care, will require all this fall & winter to effect - the let's and hindrance's thrown in our way to prevent a sufficient force to be raised in time for offensive operation (both in and out of Congress) are too well known to need a comment, these facts and considerations are sufficient to shew that this fall will not be a proper time for an active campaign; altho' one or two desultory expeditions composed of mounted volunteers may be useful and attended with success - but of this we will take another time.
I consider the indian - an enemy formidable only when he has a choice of time & ground in the fall of the year he's strong, - ferocious and full of Spirits - corn is in plenty & venison & other game every where to be met with - in the Spring - he is half starved - weak & dispirited - at this season enterprise upon him - strike at him when least expected (hitherto it has been attempted in the fall of the year) - he is timid, disconcerted, & no longer formidable.
Permit me to choose the season for operation - give me time to manoeuvre & discipline the troops, so as to inspire them with a confidence in their own prowess - and in the conduct and bravery of their officer's - Let the component parts of the Legion be perfected agreeably to the Establishment: authorise me to direct ample & proper magazines of forage, stores, and provisions to be thrown into the the advanced posts at the most convenient periods, from Fort Washington to Fort Jefferson: I would also establish a suitable magazines of forage & provision at Big Beaver from this place & Fort Washington. - I would propose two strong desultory parties, comprised of mounted volunteer's/ & I am pleased to find an avidity for this kind of service / the one against Sandusky - /which has not been abandoned as mentioned by Capt Brant) the other against the indians who have removed from the Miami villages to St. Josephs river, where by recent accounts there are several new towns of hostile indians then expeditions to take place as soon as the grass in the Praire's, would answer for pasture & not until every thing was in readiness for a forward move of the Legion from Fort Jefferson at which point the operating army should previously assemble.
These movements would probably be crowned with brilliant success; but should they have no other effect they would distract the savage councils - & create a jealously for the safety of their women & children whilst the Legion was advancing and employed in erecting small intermediate Forts at proper and convenient distances between Fort Jefferson and the point intended for establishing a strong & permanent post - I would make it an invariable rule to hault early each day & secure my camp before evening with temporary breastworks & abbatis such as to cover the troops so as to enable them to repel every kind of attack of the Savages; and to secure the baggage & stores with part of the army - should an opening offer to strike at the Enemy with the Light Corps of the Legion whilst they were mediating an attack upon us. -
Give me authority to make there arrangements, & I will pledge my reputation as an officer to establish myself at the Miami villages (or at any other place on the Miami river that may be thought more proper) - in the face of all the savages of the wilderness that can be brought against me - by the latter end of next July: at that season the indians can't continue together in large numbers for any length of time (unless supported by the British) should they collect in force & approach within striking distances in the night, with a view of surprising - or attacking me in the morning, - our Indians, guides, scouts, spies, & Dragoons (who should always patrole & hover wide round me) will not suffer the savages to advance under a covered, nor will I wait their attack - on the contrary they shall feel the effects of a nocturnal charge - & I know from experience, that they are a contemptible enemy in the night. -
I am well convinced that the expence attending these operations will be great & probably be objected to: but I am also well convinced that in the end, it will be found the most economical plan, plan that can be adopted to insure success.
The difficulty if not the impracticability of procuring & depositing sufficient magazines of forage, provision &ca at Fort Jefferson for a large number of Cavalry for any length of time will likewise be offered as a strong objection.
To obviate those objections I will beg leave to observe that there is no part of the Atlantic or middle States, where Cavalry can be supported, better or cheaper than at this place or at Fort Washington. I believe it may be demonstrated that a Horse can be fed with twelve quarts of oats or eight quarts of corn & twenty weight of good hay at the moderate rate of from twelve to thirteen pence per diem - the same at Big Bever - the points where the mounted volunteers are to assemble; these posts will be supplied with water carriage.
At Fort Hamilton there is by this time three hundred tons of Hay already secured - this has cost very little except the trouble of cutting & making - at Fort Jefferson we have not been so fortunate; but as soon as the rifle clothing arrives & I anxiously look for it every hour, I will reinforce Genl Wilkinson with the four companies of rifleman, waiting at the mouth of the great Kenhawa or Point Pleasant, and the dismounted Dragoons as fast as they arrive in order to enable him to procure as large a quantity of Hay as possible at Fort Jefferson (notwithstanding) the late disaster (it will be late & of consequence coarse & inferior, but it will do too cut & mix with indian meal; our handmills will therefore continue to be extremely useful: nor will we advance our Cavalry beyond Forts Washington & Hamilton until the moment of operation except as escorts to the supplies that must be forwarded whenever favorable opportunities offer - which must be improved upon all occasions - I have already strongly impress Genl Wilkinson with those ideas & I have directed the Quartermaster General to forward corn & oats to Fort Washington - which he has done to the amount of three thousand bushels - and three thousand more ready when the state of the river will permit boats to pass down.
I have also directed him to purchase one hundred and fifty tons of best clover & timothy hay at Whelen which is to be delivered on board the boats at 45 /p ton in fact we shall be able to land it at Fort Washington under Eight Dollar's p ton -
It's only an act of justice to the Q.M.G. to mention that I find him a man of method,industry and extensive resource - this is but a drop in the bucket towards what can be procured with facility, and what will be wanted for offensive operations.
Cloth me with authority to make the The necessary arrangements for an active war (which must from the nature of things take place) & I will establish a strong & permanent post, in any part of the indian Country that you may plan to direct. -
But is will always be attended with difficulty, expence & danger to support those posts, until we are in possession of the Lakes - then the business will be easy - all difficulties will be removed - the indians will be convinced of our power & will find it their true interest to conciliate our friendship & solicit our protection - But they must first experience our superiority in the field.
Permit me therefore to recapitulate my ideas of offensive & effectual operation (Lake Erie being out of the question)
1. We must improve the present season, in recruiting manoeuvering & discipling the troops in a manner suited to the service for which they are intended. -
2d. In providing liberal & plentiful magazines of provision Grain & other forage of stores & escorting them to the head of the line, or points from whence our operations are to commence i.e. at Fort Washington{the grand deposit), Fort Jefferson & at Big Beaver.
3d. in maturing the plan of operation & preparing every thing in order to move at a given day & hour the Legion from Fort Jefferson towards the Miami villages - the mounted volunteers of the frontier Counties of Pensylvania & Virginia from Big Beaver against the indians of Sandusky - & the the Kentucky volunteers from Fort Washington by way of Jefferson against the new hostile villages on the St. Joseph by a circuitous route.
As soon as the Corps of volunteer's have effected the object of their respective expeditions they may be dismissed, except a chosen corps of those sent again the indians on the St. Joseph's - who should fall in with & joint the Legion, as auxiliaries to the regular Dragoons, in order to assist in escorting further supplies to the Miami villages, or to strike at other Hostile towns - lower down the river as occasion might present. -
Thus Sir, I have given you my opinion & ideas of an offensive operation against the Hostile indians - under present circumstances fully & freely - agreeably to your request - I am conscious that they are very susceptible of alteration & improvement - and will therefore be extremely obliged to you to point out & supply the defects.
I would not have understood that I mean to be totally on the defensive, for this season, on the contrary I have in contemplation one if not two Desultory expeditions with mounted volunteer's volunteers & rifle men, in order to draw the attention of the savages to another quarter whilst we make the greatest efforts to throw magazines of forage provision & other stores into Fort Jefferson - and perhaps to establish a post twenty miles in front of it, or eventually upon Genl St. Clair's field of action which I presume may be effected without risking too much - with the aid of a desultory expedition against Sandusky: upon the whole I am decidedly of opinion that the war must progress & that we have no time to loose in preparing for that event. I therefore wait your orders on the occasion and am Sir with true esteem Yr. Most obedt & very Huml servt
Anty Wayne
Honbl Major Genl Knox, Secy of War